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460 WELLS 'IJ. LLOYD [21C~2d 
Moreover, . instruction 19 requested. by defendant~ rel~ted to 
the same issue. It is idle for a, party to complain of an error 
in an instruction giv:en at the request of his adversary when 
an instruction requested by him contains that, er~or. (Yolo 
Water&- Power, Co. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48 [186 p, 7721; 
(i-eorge v. City of hOS Angeles, 51 CaJ..App2d 311 [124 P.2d 
872J; Jes$ev. Giguiere, 24 Cal.App.2d 160 [74 P.2d 310J; 
see 24 Cal.Jur. 870.) 
. [11] Defendants next complain that at plaintiff's request 
the jury was inst:r.:ncted that conversations of alleged co-
conspirators could be taken into consideration in determining 
whethe~ the bank, even thQugh no agent thereof was present 
at th~conversatiQns, was a party to the conspiracy. While in-
struction 13 could have been clearer it is not open to the in-
terpretation of de~endE1nts. The jury was expressly cautioned 
that unless it first found that the bank had been established 
asa party to the aIi~ged co~spiracy, it could not corisiderthe 
testimony regarding,the conversations as tending to inculpate 
the bank. Plaintiff's instruction 11, allegedly 'including 'an 
implication that appellants admitted the perpetration' of . a 
fraud by some of the defendants, likewise is not open to the 
suggested construction. In .referring to fraud, the trial judge 
took care to add thequaUfying words "if.any," and in in-
struction 36 expressly cautioned the jury that the existence 
of fraud could be determined only from the evidence and 
could. not be inferred· from the instructions. 
Other assignments of error in the giving and refusing· .of' 
instructions as well as in the admission of evidence and allow-
ance of, comments before the jury have been examined. Upon 
a review of the entire record, it does not appear that the 
errors, if any, resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Const., 
art. VI, § 4%; Code Civ. I'roc. § 475.) The tdal court, 
therefore, did not err in denying defendants' motions for .non-
suit, new trial, judgment notwithstanding verdict or the 
motion to strike the evidence at the close of plaintiff's case. 
The judgment is affirmed. . 
Gibson., C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Spence, 
J. pro tem., concurred. 
. Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied January 
21,1943. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing. 
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[L. A. No. 18419. In Bank. Dec. 23, 19~.t 
OALIFORNIA CASUALTY INDEMNITY EXCHAN<lEl' " 
(an Inter-Insurance Exchange), P~titioner;'v)INbUS-' 
TRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION alid"J.ANE G. 
. : 1 ,. 
DUFFUS, Respondents. ' :~,' ~. ;' .. 
[1] . Workmen's Compensation-Compens,able Injurie~~anspor­
tation in Employer's Conveyance.-Wherean e!riployee, ail an. 
incident of the employment, is furnished With tl'ltnspol'tation 
to and ,from the place of e1pployment and the'means of 'trans'; 
portation are under the control of .the empli>yert.aninjury :s~ 
tained by the employee during such transportation isconipen-, 
~able. 
[2] . Id.-~ompensable Injurie8-'Transportation In Employer's Con-' 
ve,yance-Agreement.-An agreement:by an employe:.; to fur-
nish transportation to employees. may be. implie!i . from, the 
circumstances and from the uniform course ,of conduct of the, 
parties. An inference thereof may: be 'drawn from the facts. 
that the employee, when hired, understood transportation 
would' be furnished, that· on the. first day of employment she 
rode ina car, and that she was theninformedihitt it was' the' 
company .car and that a deduction from her wages for its use 
would be made. 
, [3] Id. - Compensable Injuries,..- Transportation in Employer'i 
Conveyance-Agreement.~An inference of an agreement by 
an 'employer to furnish employees with transp~rtation 'is not 
prechide'd by his right to withdraw the privilege at any time, 
or by the employee's freedom to use other transportation. ) 
[4] Id.-Compensable Injurie~Transportation in Conveyanc~ 
Incident to Employment.-Where transportation is reguilU'ly 
furnished by an employer to' employees solely because of their 
status as such, it .. may be inferred that transportation depends. ' 
on the ·fact· of employment and is-incidental thereto. 
[5] Id. - Compensable Injuries- Transportation in Employer's 
Conveyance - Employee's Payment. - An employer's agree-
ment to furnish transportation to employees is not trans-' 
. [1] InjUry while going to or coming from work, notes, 10 A.J;..R., ' 
169; 21 A.L.R. ,1223; 24 A.L.R.1233; 62 A.L.R.1438; 87 A.L.R. 250. 
See, also, 27 Cal.Jur. 383, 
McK. Dig. References: [1-5] W orkmen'sCompensation, § 100;' 
[6] Workmen's Compensation, § 77. 
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formed into an independent contract of carriage by the 'fact 
that a charge is made therefor, where the consideration for the 
transportation is employment as well. ' 
[6] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Rendering Service at Time.-
Workmen's compensation is recoverlj,ble although the employee 
is not rendering service to his employer at the time, where the 
danger from which the injury results is one to which, he is 
exposed by his particular employment. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Ac-
cident Commission awarding damages"for personal injuries. 
Award affirmed. 
Richard L. Oliver and Judd Downing for Petitioner .. 
Everett A. Corten and Dan Murphy, Jr., for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Jane Duffus was employed as a stenog-
rapher in Fullerton by the, Val Vita Food Products; Inc. 
She and several other employees of the company lived in' 
Los Angeles thirty-three miles away, and for their conve-
nience the company purchased an automobile to transport 
them to and from work. There was a bus line between Los 
, Angeles and Fullerton, and the employees were not required 
to use the automobile, but those who did were charged $4.00 
amonth,representing a pro rata share of the running ex-
penses, which was deducted from their wages. The employees 
would decide among themselves who was to drive, and' there 
, was no regular driver. The employee who lived the farthest 
away would drive the car home, keep it over night' and in 
the morning pick up the other employees on the way to work. 
On April 18, 1941, three employees of the Val Vita com- , 
pany, including Mrs. Duffus; were driving home in the au-
tomobile. One of them left the car, and shortly thereafter 
it collided with another automobile, injuring Mrs. Duffus. 
The employees had punched the time clock before leaving 
the plant, but, as was their custom, had taken with them 
office mail, which they, deposited in a mail box on the road. 
The driver of the automobile had also taken samples to be 
delivered to a salesman of the company in Los Angeles. Mrs. 
, ,Duffus was not driving the car at the time of the collision. 
She applied for compensation under the California Work-
, men's Compensation Act, and the Industrial Accident Com-
mission made an award in her favor. ·Theinsurer of the 
Dec. 1942] , CAL. CAS. INDEM. ExcEt V. IND~ .A.cc~ COM.: 463-
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Val Vita company now petitions for a writ to review this 
award, contending that the evidence does not support the 
finding of the commission that the accident arose out of and 
occurred in the course of the applicant's employment. 
[1] Petitioner contends that the case falls within the gen~' 
eral rule that injuries sustained by an employee while going 
to or coming from his place of employment are not compen-
sable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. (See 21' 
Cal.Jur. 380.) It is well recognized, however" that if an 
employer, as an incident of the employment, furnishes his 
employee with transportation to and from the place of eIp.' 
ployment and the means of transportation are under the con., 
trol of the employer, an injury' sustained by the employee 
during such transportation arises out of and is' in the course: 
of the employment and is compensable. (Dominguez v. Pen-
dola, 46 Cal.App. 220 [188 P. 1025]; Trussles8 Roof 00. ,v; 
Industrial Ace. Oom., 119 Cal.App.91 [6 P.2d 254}; Rader 
v. Keeler; 129 Cal.App. 114 [18 P.2d360] ; see Dellepiani v. 
Industrial Ace. Oom., 211 CaL 430 [295 P. 826]; Smith Vi, 
Industrial Ace. Oom., 18 Ca1.2d 843, 846-847 [118 P.2d 6] ; 
10 A.L.R. 169; 21 A.L.R. 1223; 24 A.L.R. 1233; 62 A.L.R. 
1438;87 A.L.R. 250; 9 So.Cal.L.Rev. 63; cf. Oalifornia 
Highway Oom. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 61 Cal.App. ,284 
[214 P. 658].) The case of St. Helens Oolliery 00., Ltd. v. 
Hewitson, (1924) Appeal Cases 59, upon which petitioner 
relies, represents the English rule but not the law in the' 
United, States. (American Ooal Mining 00. v. Orenshaw, 
77 Ind.App. 644 [133 N.E. 394]; Phi!er'sDependents' v. 
Foremost Dairy, 200 N.C. 65 [156 S.N.. 147,62 A.L.R. 
1438] .) There is no question that ,the automobile in the 
instant case was furnished by the employer to the employees 
for' the purpose of transporting them to and from work. It 
is also clear that the car was under the employer's controL 
(Tr~ssless Roo/Oo. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., supra; Konopka 
v. Jackson Oounty Road Oom., 270 Mich. 174 [258 N.W.429, 
97 A.L.R 552]; Phifer's Dependents v. Foremost Dairy, BU·, 
praj McClain v. Kingsport Improvement Oorp., 147 Tenn.' 
130 [245 S.W. 837] ; Swanson v. Latham & Orane, 92 Conn. 
87 [101 A. 492] .; Osterhout v. Latham & Orane, 92 Conn. 91' 
[101 A. 494].) 
Petitioner, contends, however, that the, t:r:anSportation fur·' 
nished the employees of the company was not an incident' 
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might use or not as they wished. The employer, however, 
supplied transportation to and from its office as a regular 
practice, and the employee regularly used that transporta-
tion. [2] An agreement by an employer to furnish trans-
portation need not be express; it may be implied from the 
eircumstances of the case and the uniform course of conduct 
of the parties. (Rader v. Keeler, supraj In re Donovan, 217 
Mass. 76 [104 N.E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 778] ; Konopka v. 
Jackson Oounty Road Com., supraj Southern States Mfg. 
, Co. v. Wright, 146 Fla. 29' [200 So. 375]; Venho v. Ostrander 
By. ~Timber Co., 185 Wash. 138 [52,P.2d 1267, 1268] ; see 
Breland v. Traylor Engineering ~ Mfg. 00., 52 Cal.App.2d 
415 [126 P.2d 455].) Mrs. Duffus testified that when she 
was hired she, understood that transportation to and from 
the office would be furnished her. On the first day of her 
employment she rode to work in the automobile and was told, 
by one of the employees who had stopped for her that i~ 
was a company ,car, and that $4 a month for its use woul,d 
be deducted from her wages. These facts were sufficient 
to support an inference, that there was an implied agreement, 
to furnish transportation. 
[3] Petitioner contends, however, that such an agreemel1-t 
cannot be inferred because the employer was under noobli-
gation to p,rovide the automobile and could discontinue its 
Use at anytin:);e, an¢!. the employees were under no obliga-
tion to USe it and could use other available means of tranS~ 
portation"at any time. These considerations, however~ do 
not preclude' the, eXistence of an implied agreement on the, 
part of the employer to furnish the transportation as an, 
incident of the employment. The employer's right to with. 
di-awthe privilege of using the car was merely a right to 
terminate the contract at will, and was uot inconsistent 'with 
the existence of the agreement~ A contract at will remains 
a contract until it is terminated. Contracts of employment 
are' usually of this nature, and the fact that an employer, 
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, may at any 
time terminate the employment or change any of its terms, 
such as the amount of the' employee's wages, does not pre-
clude the existence of the contract. Likewise, the employee's 
freedom to use other transportation no more precludes the 
existence of an agreement than the freedom of the purchaser 
of a railroad' ticket to use other transportation than that 
for which he paid. (American Oool Mining 00. v. Orenshaw, 
Dec; 1942] CAL. CAS. INDEM. EXCH. V. IND. Acc. Cl)v. 465 
[21 C.2d 4611 
suprajKonop'ka v. Jackson County Road Oom., supra.) The 
,basic contract between the parties was one for employment. 
Although such' contrac~ may consist simply ofa promise to 
work in: exchange for a promise to pay a certain wage, they 
may also in.volv:e additional promis~ by e~ther ,Party. An 
employer may give his employee, III conSIderatIOn f?r the 
employee's work, both a wage and the, accommodatIOn of 
transportation to and from the place of employment. In the 
present case' the employer was obligated to pay Mrs. Duffus 
the agreed wage and to furnish the automobile for her trans-
portlltion. ~he in turn was obligated to perform the work 
for which she was hired and to pay $4 a month for transpor-
tatiollto and from work. 
[4] Petitioner contends that even if the evidence shows 
an agreement to furnish transportation it w:as. not part of, 
the contraet of hire and therefore not an Illcldent of the 
employment. Transportation may be incidental to the em-
'ployment, however ,even though it is, only a collateral or , , .. " 
subsidiary part of the contract of employment, or s?me-
thing added to the principal part of that ~ontract as ammo;; 
but none the less a real, feature or detaIl of the contract. 
(In re Donovan, supra.) Since the transportation was regu-
larly furnished to the employee solely because of her status 
as an employee, the inference is reasonable that the trans-
portation depended upon t~efact o~ the employment and was 
incidental to it. (See Dom~nguez v. Pendola, s1£pra.) [6] The 
employer's charge for :the transportation, did not ~ra,iisf?rm 
tJle agreement into an independent contract of Carr,lage,. smce 
the consideration for the employer's agreement was not SImply 
the payment of the $4 monthly, but. the perform~n~e of work 
,for the company as well. (Amer~can Ooal ,M~mng 00. v. 
Orenshaw supra.) The fact that the charge was deduc!ed 
from the;mployee's wages definitely indicated the connectIOn 
of the transportation with her contract of employment. . 
[6] Petitioner contends that the applicant was not actmg 
within the course of her employment at the tim~ of her .in-
jury because she was not performing any ser;~ce gr~W1~g 
out, of or incidental to her employment. It IS not mdIS-
pens able to recovery, however, that .the emplo~ee. be render-
ing service to his employer at the tIme of the InJury. (Do-
minguez v. Pendola, supra; Western Pipe etc. 00. v. Indus-
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Smith v~ Industrial Ace. Com., supra.) The essential pre-
'requisite to compensation is that the danger from which the 
injury results be one to which he is exposed as an employee 
in his part,icular employment. This requirement is met when, 
as an employee and solely by reason of his relationship as 
such to his employer, he enters a vehicle regularly provided 
by his employer for the purpose of transporting him to or 
from the place of employment. (Dominguez v. Pendola, 
supra.) 
The award is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, 
J., and Spence, J. pro tem., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 4431. In Bank. Dec. 31, 1942.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN SANCHEZ etal., 
Defendants; ANGELO JOHN PORRELLO, Appellant. 
[11 Evidence-Judicial Notice-Courts-Juvenile Courts.-A re-
viewing court Dlay take judicial, notice of a superior court's 
designation of a department thereof to sit as a juvenile coUrt. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1875, subd. 3.) 
[2] 
[8] 
Criminal Law-Appeal-Presumptions-Transfer of Cause.-
In, the absence of a showing in the record to the contrary, 
wherealninor defendant was sentenced on his plea of guilty 
following a transfer of the cause to the department designat¥ 
asajuvenile court, it wilIbe presumed that the juvenile court 
remanded the cause to the criminal department and that it 
had power to accept defendant's plea of guilty. 
Id.-ltevlew-On Appeals from Orders""":Refusal to Vacate.-
On appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a judg-
ment, the reviewing court may not review alleged error in the 
trial court's recessing as a' criminal court and reconvening as 
a juvenile ,court instead of transferring the case to the juve-
nile court department, or in declaring the defendant a ward 
of the juvenile court after he had been presumably remanded 
[I] ,See 10 Cal.J~. 727; 20 Am:Jur. 101. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Evidence, § 67; [2] Criminal Law, 
§1276; [3] Criminal Law, §1263a; [4] Courts, §159; [5] De-
linquent Childi-en, §19. 
Dec. 1942] PEOPLE V. SANCHEZ 
[21 O,2d 466] 
467 
to the superior court for prosecution. Such errors may be 
reviewed only on a direct appeal from the order. 
[4] Courts-Superior Court-Departments.-Where defendant is 
declared a ward of a juvenile court, no other department of 
the superior court acting in a general capacity has jurisdic-
tional authority to act in the matter, the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court being exclusive. 
[5] Delinquent Children-Suspension of Criminal Proceedings-
Remand.-Where a defendant has been declared a ward of 
the juvenile court, the superior court cannot perfonn in a 
single capacity functions as a juvenile court and as a superior 
court acting under the general law, and by a single formal order 
vacate the commitment to a house of correction and sentence 
the defendant to the state penitentiary. Such order is void and 
should be set aside on motion. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County refusing to set aside a judgment. Benjamin 
J. Scheinman, Judge. Reversed. 
Morris Lavine for Appellant. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and Alberta Belford, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On March 4, 1941, an information was 
filed by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County against 
defendant Angelo John Porrello and two others accusing 
'them in counts one and two of the crime of robbery, and of 
,-attempted robbery in count three. Defendant, a seventeen-
year-old boy, was arraigned in Department 41 of the Superior 
Court of LOll Angeles County and pleaded not guilty to all 
'caurits of the information. Trial of the action was set for 
April 16, 1941, and the case transferred to Department '44. 
On the day of the trial the judge of Department 44 trans-
ferred the case to Department 39, the department of the 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County designated to hold 
,sessions as a juvenile court. The transcript gives no indica-
tion of' the proceedings in Department 39, but shows that on 
the following day defendant again appeared in Department 
44, withdrew his plea of "not guilty" to count one, pleaded 
[4] 8ee 7 Cal.Jur. 681; 14 'Cal.Jur. 136; 31 Am.Jur. 798. 
[5] t?ee 14 Cal.Jur. 138; 6 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Sup». 461. 
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